



The President's Daily Brief

11 November 1972

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

11 November 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[redacted] Vietnam [redacted] 25X1
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[redacted] (Page 1) 25X1

In Laos, Vang Pao is preparing new offensive operations toward the southern tip of the Plaine des Jarres. (Page 2)

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[redacted] (Page 4) 25X1


Chancellor Brandt is skillfully exploiting the inter-German treaty in the election campaign. (Page 5)

At Annex, we examine the inter-German treaty in relation to Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik and analyze what the agreement does for each side.

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VIETNAM



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
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
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LAOS

General Vang Pao is preparing another attempt to advance north toward the Plaine des Jarres. Several understrength irregular battalions, about 1,300 troops, are being airlifted to Khang Kho to join the 500-800 irregulars holding the government's only remaining high ground position in the hills about four miles south of the Plaine. They will attempt to secure the area in preparation for offensive operations toward the Plaine.

An intercept of 9 November shows that Communist units have been alerted to the possibility of another government advance.

The North Vietnamese still have major elements of three infantry regiments in the area, in addition to armor and artillery units. They should be able to repel Vang Pao's troops. Nevertheless, the push will hamper any Communist concentration against the government's defense lines between the Plaine and Long Tieng.

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
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


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


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WEST. GERMANY

Chancellor Brandt is skillfully exploiting the inter-German treaty in the current election campaign. The publicity attending each of the stages involved in concluding the treaty has served to keep Brandt in the limelight and to focus public attention on Ostpolitik, his strong point, rather than on domestic issues such as inflation, where he is vulnerable.

Opposition leader Barzel's public comments on the treaty have been cautious, but he is worried about its effect on the elections. Yesterday, Barzel complained bitterly to Ambassador Hillenbrand about the Four Power declaration on the treaty, characterizing the declaration as interference in the German electoral campaign. He sharply criticized the treaty itself and said it was unacceptable as it now stands. Barzel said he would accordingly make a comprehensive statement on the subject before the elections, although he did not intend to criticize the allies in that statement.

Despite the treaty, the election is far from in the bag for Brandt. A late October poll--taken before the treaty but after the announcement of a further rise in the cost-of-living index in September--showed new slippage for the government parties. Although the coalition Social Democrats and Free Democrats together remained slightly ahead of the opposition, the Free Democrats hovered just above the minimum five percent needed for parliamentary representation.

Aside from the treaty's immediate impact on the election, it is a development of major importance for West Germany and its role in Europe in the era of detente. These aspects are discussed at Annex.

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NOTES

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Cuba-Caribbean: [Redacted]	25X1
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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY

The inter-German treaty initialed in Bonn on 8 November is a compromise. Although the negotiators were unable to resolve sharply opposed views on the fundamentals of relations between the two states, the treaty establishes a basis on which East and West Germany can take up formal relations with each other for the first time. Beyond this, the pact complements the West German treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland of 1970 in satisfying Eastern conditions for more normal relations, and is thus a principal element in Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik. The treaty is part and parcel of Brandt's innovative effort over the past decade to ease East-West tensions and lift the mortgages of the war--all with the greater goal--in Brandt's view--of promoting conditions in Central Europe conducive to eventual German reunification. Although an inter-German treaty was not a prerequisite for holding a Conference on European Security or beginning MBFR talks, it nevertheless serves to generate new momentum in this area.

For Pankow, the treaty opens the way to the long-elusive Western acceptance of its legitimacy, which in turn will lead to general international recognition, membership in the UN and other international organizations, and participation in international accords and conventions. For Moscow the treaty, along with the earlier Soviet and Polish treaties, provides a kind of confirmation of postwar Central European "political realities."

The treaty will quickly open the way to completing Ostpolitik's structural framework. Bonn and Prague will soon renew their efforts to find a compromise on the issue of the Munich Agreement of 1938--the major roadblock to conclusion of a treaty of reconciliation. Bonn will then move to establish diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria. The ensuing fleshing out of Ostpolitik will see a gradual expansion of West German economic and political activity throughout Eastern Europe.

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The treaty undermines some fundamental pretensions of both states--East Germany as the nucleus of a Communist Germany, and West Germany as the only legitimate German government--but leaves others untouched. The statement that the two continue to disagree on issues of principle, "including the national question," allows Bonn to maintain that there is still a common German nationhood. It also permits Pankow to assert that common nationhood disappeared with the creation of two German states. Pankow refused to include in the treaty itself references to the absence of a World War II peace treaty and to continuing Four Power rights and responsibilities in Germany and Berlin, on grounds they would impugn East Germany's sovereignty. Pankow did, however, agree to exchange letters acknowledging that the treaty does not affect Allied rights and responsibilities, and Bonn can point to the new Four Power declaration affirming these rights as safeguarding its position. The agreement to exchange "permanent representatives" is a compromise designed to meet Pankow's desire to establish diplomatic relations and Bonn's insistence on not recognizing East Germany as a foreign country.

Brandt never expected the treaty to "bring down the Berlin Wall." He does, however, hope to inaugurate an era of easing tensions and abating hostilities in inter-German relations, and to improve the conditions of people in both countries. Thus, for him, almost as important as the treaty itself are the ancillary agreements that have been or soon will be reached with East Germany. As arranged during the negotiations, the East Germans will open a number of new border crossing points, permit children to join parents who fled to West Germany, and allow West Germans residing near the frontier to visit adjacent areas in East Germany. For the first time Bonn and Pankow will accept and accredit each other's press correspondents.

Recognition of East Germany

Several countries, including many NATO allies, are eager to recognize East Germany for what they see as both political and economic advantage. Bonn is seeking reaffirmation by NATO that recognition should await treaty ratification, but Denmark and

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Norway claim to be under domestic pressure and may disregard any NATO strictures. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the British are urging that the US, British, and French missions in Berlin begin consultations to coordinate their approaches to Pankow. The neutrals--Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland--may move as soon as late November or early December, regardless of Bonn's views.

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The international recognition and UN membership that the inter-German treaty will bring in its train should give an unprecedented boost, at least in the short term, to the self-confidence of the East German regime. At home, however, it will have to maintain its guard against any erosion of its control stemming from increased contacts with West Germany. Interest in travel to the West has revived since the conclusion of the Berlin agreements, and there has been a marked increase in refugees.

Internationally, Pankow can be expected to follow the Soviet lead closely, for East Germany remains the linchpin of Moscow's European security system. Nevertheless, it is possible that CSCE and MBFR will evolve in such a way as to weaken the East German - Soviet interdependency and to promote assertiveness in Pankow. There is evidence, even aside from Ulbricht's dismissal, that Ostpolitik has caused some strain in Pankow's relations with Moscow. Soviet diplomats involved in the Four Power negotiations on the Berlin Agreement in 1971 and in the talks this year concerning UN membership of both German states have testified to East German sensitivity and stubbornness on issues affecting Pankow's conception of its sovereignty.

With Ostpolitik, of which this treaty is a major component, West Germany has served notice that it has come of age in international affairs. The essence of the new spirit in Bonn is that West German governments henceforth will be more assertive of what they perceive to be their national self-interest. Although West Germany's orientation will remain essentially Western, leaders in Bonn will increasingly be dealing with the Soviets, Chinese, and Eastern Europeans, and these states

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will have a greater presence in West Germany than heretofore. Should Barzel replace Brandt, however, he would be politically more limited in the pursuit of Ostpolitik.

In any event, the inter-German treaty does not necessarily signal the end of all the old cold-war tensions. There are still many differences and much mutual distrust that will not be quickly overcome. Moreover, the treaty is something of a gamble for Bonn. Pankow's gains--international recognition and UN membership--cannot be withdrawn, but West Germany's are largely intangible. Bonn's concrete gains lie largely outside the treaty in the areas of practical improvements granted by Pankow. These presumably are still subject to restriction when and if it should suit Soviet and East German interests.

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